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INTRODUCTION

Any discussion of hypnotically refreshed testimony must begin by
defining hypnosis. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. A list
of the various definitions that have been offered for the term could
easily fill a couple of pages.' However, such an exercise is unnecessary for present purposes. Instead, this Article will proceed under the
influence of a relatively broad definition of hypnosis; i.e., a state of

consciousness that entails the concentration of attention on a specific
theme or image with an accompanying diminished interest in one's
surroundings. 2
t Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. B.A. & J.D.,
University of Kentucky; LL.M., Yale Law School. The author would like to thank
Shannon Pritchard and Nancy Gordon for their valuable research assistance.
1.

See DANIEL BROWN ET AL., MEMORY, TRAUMA TREATMENT, AND THE LAW

288-89 (1998); 2 JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 13:21 (2002); ALAN W. SCHEFLIN & JERROLD LEE
SHAPIRO, TRANCE ON TRIAL 121-23 (1989).
2. RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN WAT-rERS, MAKING MONSTERS:
RIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY,

AND

SEXUAL

HYSTERIA

FALSE MEMOSCHEFLIN &

143 (1994); see also

SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 134 ("Hypnosis is an altered state of consciousness, characterized by intensified concentration of awareness on certain suggested themes, along
with a diminished interest in competing perceptions. Subjects who are hypnotized
experience perceptual and sensory distortions and enhanced abilities to utilize normally unconscious mental mechanisms."); Alan W. Scheflin et al., Forensic Uses of
Hypnosis, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 474, 478 (Allen K. Hess &
Irving B. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1999) ("Hypnosis is a complex alteration in consciousness that can be understood as attentive, receptive concentration characterized by
parallel, or dissociated, awareness. This shift in concentration may result in intense
absorbing perceptual experiences but is always controllable and reversible. It may
involve sensitivity to internal cues in self-hypnosis.").
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The roots of hypnosis can be traced to late eighteenth and nineteenth century physicians who used the technique in their practices.3
In the late 1800s, hypnosis caught the attention of Sigmund Freud,

who used it with his patients before abandoning it in favor of free

association.4 The modern interest in the practice developed at the end
of World War II when it was discovered that soldiers suffering from

war stress disorders responded favorably to hypnosis.5 From that
time until now, the use of hypnosis has become more pervasive.6 For
example, in a survey that sought to gather information about psycho-

therapists' attitudes towards hypnosis and the prevalence of its use in
their practices, over one-half of the 869 respondents said that they
used hypnosis in their work, and over one-third of the respondents
said that they, at least occasionally, used it to retrieve memories from
their patients.7

Following the lead of clinicians, the use of hypnosis in criminal investigations has increased over the last few decades,8 and it is this use
that will be the focus of this Article. Specifically, this Article will look

at the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony in the criminal
courts. In Part II, attention will turn to a review of how the common
law has responded to the questions raised by hypnotically refreshed
testimony. With this background in mind, Parts III and IV will proceed to consider the impact the United States Supreme Court case of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.9 may have on this evidence. Part III will discuss Daubert and the more recent case of
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,1" in an effort to detail the construct
3. Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45
L. REV. 1185, 1209 (1992); see also MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:22 ("[I]n the
late 1800s, hypnosis began to receive a substantial amount of attention as a pathway
to the unconscious.").
4. Kanovitz, supra note 3, at 1209-10.
5. Id. at 1210; BROWN ET AL., supra note 1, at 291; SCHEFLIN & SHAPIRO, supra
note 1, at 56.
6. See Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of PretrialHypnosis on
a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313, 320-21 (1980).
7. Michael D. Yapko, Suggestibility and Repressed Memories of Abuse: A Survey
of Psychotherapists'Beliefs, 36 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 163, 166 (1994). See generally D. Stephen Lindsay & J. Don Read, "Memory Work" and Recovered Memories of
Childhood Sexual Abuse: Scientific Evidence and Public, Professional,and Personal
Issues, 12 PsYcHoL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 846, 851 (1995) (reporting on a 1995 survey by
"certified psychotherapists in the United States . . . and the United Kingdom ...
[which] found that 71% ... [of the respondents] reported using technique[s] such as
hypnosis, body work, and dream interpretation to help clients remember [child sexual
abuse]").
8. See Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed
or Enhanced Testimony, 77 A.L.R.4H 927, 932-33 (1991); Kevin M. McConkey, Hypnosis, Memory, and the Ethics of Uncertainty, 30 AUSTL. PSYCHOLOGIST, March 1995,
at 1, 2; SCHEFLIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 66-68; Gary M. Shaw, The Admissibility
of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony in Criminal Trials, 75 MARO. L. REV. 1, 42
(1991).
9. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
VAND.
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that Daubert has created to test the reliability of scientific evidence.
Then, Part IV will employ this new construct as a means of investigating whether the behavioral science literature can support the forensic
application of hypnotically refreshed testimony in criminal prosecutions.
Before proceeding further, one important caveat needs to be considered. The typical scenario that serves as the background for this
Article is that of a subject being put under hypnosis as a means of
retrieving a memory that is otherwise unavailable to the subject due to
traumatic amnesia. Generally, although not well-defined and differentiated, "the psychological defense mechanisms of repression, suppression, and dissociation are invoked" as the explanations that justify
the use of hypnosis to extract unavailable memories." The validity of
the concept of psychological defense and the specific mechanisms just
mentioned are part of the controversy surrounding the use of hypnosis," especially in the instances that involve the phenomenon of "recovered memories."' 3 Therefore, as a precursor to litigating the
reliability of any particular strand of hypnotically refreshed testimony,
one should anticipate the possibility of a reliability battle surrounding
these psychological mechanisms. A debate, however, on the reliability of the science that underlies these mechanisms is beyond the scope
of this Article.
II.

THE COMMON LAW RESPONSE TO HYPNOTICALLY
REFRESHED TESTIMONY

For the vast majority of this country's history, the courts have refused to allow hypnotically refreshed testimony into evidence.1 4 However, that changed in 1968, when the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, in Harding v. State,'5 upheld the admission of hypnotically
refreshed testimony from the victim of a brutal assault who recalled
under hypnosis that it was the defendant who had sexually attacked
her. 1 6 Even though the victim provided different accounts of her attack over time and achieved her in-court version of events only after
being hypnotized, the Hardingcourt said that any questions regarding
11. Fred H. Frankel & Nicholas A. Covino, Hypnosis and Hypnotherapy, in
344, 347 (Paul S. Appelbaum et al. eds., 1997).
12. See id. at 348, 353-55.
13. See Lindsay & Read, supra note 7, at 846-47; McConkey, supra note 8, at 4.
14. Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 476.
15. 246 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968), overruled by State v. Collins, 464
A.2d 1028 (Md. 1983).
16. Id. at 305-06. Prior to being placed under hypnosis, the victim had identified
the defendant as the person who shot her, but she had not claimed that he also raped
her. Id. at 304-06.
TRAUMA AND MEMORY
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the reliability of the hypnotically refreshed testimony went to the
weight of the testimony and not to its admissibility.17
Following Harding'slead, other courts began to admit hypnotically
refreshed testimony in criminal cases,1 8 and this encouraged police
agencies to expand their use of hypnosis as an investigative technique.1 9 This, perhaps inevitably, led to investigative abuses and to
increased scrutiny and criticism of the use of hypnotically refreshed
testimony from courts, legislatures, professional groups, and scholars.2" Eventually, this heightened consideration of the issue resulted
in four different approaches to the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony, ranging from liberal admission to absolute prohibition. Between these two extremes, a number of courts have tried to
fashion tests that limit the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony to situations where its reliability has been sufficiently
established.
At one end of the admissibility spectrum lies the per se admissible
approach to hypnotically refreshed testimony.2 1 Jurisdictions that follow this path hold that the effect of a hypnotic session on the reliability of a witness's recall goes to the weight and credibility of the
witness's testimony and not to its admissibility or to the witness's competence. 22 These courts place great faith in the ability of the jury to
evaluate the testimony accurately in light of cross-examination, expert
testimony, and jury instructions.2 3 As one court put it regarding the
first of these safeguards, "skillful cross-examination will enable the
jury to evaluate the effect of hypnosis on the witness and the credibility of his testimony. ' 24 This
per se admissible approach "has sparsely
"
been followed since 1980. 125
At the opposite end of the admissibility spectrum lie a larger number of jurisdictions that hold that hypnotically refreshed testimony is
17. Id. at 306. A majority of the court's opinion was spent assessing the sufficiency
of the victim's testimony to support the defendant's conviction for attempted rape.
See id. at 306-12.
18. See Shaw, supra note 8, at 42.
19. See id.; Fleming, supra note 8, at 932-33.
20. See MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:23; SCHEFLIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at
71; Shaw, supra note 8, at 42-43; see also Diamond, supra note 6, passim (the entire
article is such a critique).
21. See Fleming, supra note 8, at 934; MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:36; Shaw,
supra note 8, at 15-16.
22. See Fleming, supra note 8, at 934; MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:36; Shaw,
supra note 8, at 15-16 & n.80 (listing the states following this approach).
23. See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6011, at 124 (1990).
24. State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983).
25. People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989); see also Roark v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Ky. 2002) ("Only four state court jurisdictions presently
follow the rule of per se admissibility.").
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per se inadmissible. 6 Some of these courts will not allow a witness
who has been hypnotized regarding the matter under consideration to
take the stand at all.
Others will not allow a witness to take the
stand and testify about memories that were recovered as a result of a
hypnotic session.2 8 In this second category of cases, if a party wants to
put a witness on the stand who has been hypnotized in connection
with the substance of his testimony, the court must be convinced that
the subject matter of that testimony is based entirely upon recollections that were available to the witness before she was hypnotized.29
One rationale given by many of the per se inadmissible jurisdictions
is that, consistent with the requirements of the test first enunciated in
Frye v. United States, 30 hypnosis "has not gained general acceptance
within the relevant scientific community as a reliable means of [extracting] historically accurate memor[ies]." 3 1 Furthermore, there are
courts that have barred this testimony based upon the claim that its
admission would violate a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him because of the tendency of hypnosis to lead to memory hardening; that is, overconfidence on the part of
the witness regarding those matters recalled under hypnosis. 32 Finally, some courts embrace the per se inadmissible approach on the
ground that the prosecution's use of hypnotically refreshed testimony
violates due process.3 3 These courts hold that a defendant is deprived
of a fair trial when the state hypnotizes a witness, because any resulting taint of the witness's memory is equivalent to tampering with or
manufacturing evidence.3 4 Such taint can result from the fact that an
individual under hypnosis is susceptible to suggestion from verbal and
26. See Roark, 90 S.W.3d at 32 ("At present, twenty-six states adhere to some
form of the per se inadmissible rule."); Fleming, supra note 8, at 933-34; MORIARTY,
supra note 1, § 13:38; Shaw, supra note 8, at 16 & nn. 82-83 (listing the states following this approach); 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23, § 6011, at 128-31.
27. See Fleming, supra note 8, at 933-34; MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:38; 27
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23, § 6011, at 128-29.
28. MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:38; see 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23,
§ 6011, at 129.
29. MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:38.
30. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The defendant in Frye, who had been convicted
of second degree murder, challenged the trial court's refusal to allow him to introduce
expert testimony regarding the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test that
he had taken. Id. at 1013-14. The court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's ruling,
saying that expert testimony based upon a scientific principle or discovery will be
admitted when that principle or discovery is "sufficiently established [so as] to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
31. MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:38; see Fleming, supra note 8, at 934; 27
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23, § 6011, at 132-33 (1990 & Supp. 2002).
32. Fleming, supra note 8, at 934; see MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:38; 27
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23, § 6011, at 147-48 (1990).
33. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23, § 6011, at 160.
34. See id.
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nonverbal cues planted by the hypnotist,35 and from the fact that a
hypnotized person may fill in the gaps in her memory, or "confabulate," as a means of making her recollection of an event more
comprehensible.3 6
Before leaving the per se inadmissible approach, a United States
Supreme Court case from the 1980s needs to be discussed because of
its undeniable impact on this issue. In Rock v. Arkansas,3 7 the Court
held Arkansas's rule that a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony was per se inadmissible to be unconstitutional.38
Although it acknowledged that the dangers of memory hardening,
suggestibility, and confabulation all created the potential for hypnosis
to generate inaccurate memories,3 9 the Court nevertheless concluded
that certain procedural safeguards could reduce the likelihood of error
in post-hypnotic testimony.4 0 Therefore, because the right to testify
on one's behalf is so rooted in the Constitution,4 1 the Court found
Arkansas's inflexible approach to a criminal defendant's hypnotically
refreshed testimony to be an "arbitrary restriction on the [defendant's] right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State
repudiating the validity of all post-hypnosis recollections. '4' Even
though the Court explicitly limited the reach of its holding by refusing
to express an opinion as to the appropriate rule of admissibility for
testimony from previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal
defendants, 3 the case has caused a number of jurisdictions to at least
reconsider their per se ban on hypnotically refreshed testimony.44
In contrast to the two polar opposite treatments of hypnotically refreshed testimony, a number of jurisdictions employ one of two
schemes that require the proffered testimony to satisfy a certain level
of reliability before a judge will allow it to be considered for its substance. 5 The first of these traces its roots to a New Jersey Supreme
Court case from 1981 called State v. Hurd.a6
35. MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:26; see 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23,
§ 6011, at 119-20.
36. MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:28; see 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23,
§ 6011, at 120-21.
37. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
38. Id. at 62.
39. Id. at 59-60.
40. Id. at 60-61.
41. Id. at 51-53. The Court grounded this constitutional right in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, and the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony."
Id. at 51-53.
42. Id. at 61.
43. Id. at 58 n.15.
44. Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65, 78-88 (Md. 1999); see 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra
note 23, § 6011, at 166 & n.196.
45. See Fleming, supra note 8, at 934; MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:37; 27
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23, § 6011, at 167-75 (1990 & Supp. 2002).
46. 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
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In Hurd, the court was called upon to review the admissibility of
hypnotically refreshed testimony that implicated the defendant in a
knife attack on his ex-wife.4 7 By casting the inquiry in terms of
whether hypnosis was generally accepted by the scientific community
"as a means of overcoming amnesia and restoring the memory of a
witness," instead of requiring it to be generally accepted as a means of
reviving historically accurate recall, the court found that the process
satisfied its formulation of the Frye test.4 8 The court justified this
more forgiving posture toward hypnotically refreshed testimony by
equating recall generated through hypnosis with recall generated
through more traditional means, which the court noted was "often historically inaccurate."4 9 For a number of reasons, however, the Hurd
court was concerned about the reliability of hypnotically refreshed
testimony within the context of specific cases. °
Relying upon the trial court testimony of Dr. Martin Orne, a leading expert of the day on hypnosis, and other authorities available to it,
the Hurd court listed several features of the hypnotic experience that
it believed called the ability of hypnosis to obtain accurate recall into
question. 5 1 First, a person undergoing hypnosis is extremely vulnerable to suggestions that can take the form of "intentional or inadvertent cues."152 Second, a person under hypnosis is susceptible to a loss
of critical judgment, in that he is "more willing to speculate and will
respond to questions with a confidence he would not have as a waking
person."5 3 Third, in response to a post-hypnotic suggestion that he
will remember what he has recalled under hypnosis after he awakes
from the trance, a person coming out of hypnosis may indiscriminately
confound or mix his hypnotic recall together with his waking memory.5 4 And fourth, after coming out of hypnosis, the person "will have
strong subjective confidence in the validity of his new recall" (i.e., the
aforementioned "memory hardening"), making it "difficult for an expert or a jury to judge the credibility of his memory."5 5
Although the Hurd court was troubled by these potential problems,
it believed that "a rule of per se inadmissibility [was] unnecessarily
broad and [would] result in the exclusion of evidence that [was] as
trustworthy as other eyewitness testimony."5 6 Therefore, it held that
"testimony enhanced through hypnosis [was] admissible in a criminal
47. Id. at 88-89.
48. Id. at 92 ("The purpose of using hypnosis is not to obtain truth, as a polygraph
or 'truth serum' is supposed to do. Instead, hypnosis is employed as a means of overcoming amnesia and restoring the memory of a witness.").
49. See id.
50. See id. at 92-94.
51. See id. at 92-95.
52. Id. at 93.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 93-94.
56. Id. at 94.
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trial if the [judge found] that the use of hypnosis in the particular case
was reasonably likely to result in recall comparable in accuracy to normal human memory."5 7 Consistent with this case-by-case approach,
the court fashioned a test that put the burden on the proponent of the
hypnotically refreshed testimony to prove its reliability to a clear and
convincing standard, taking into account "both the kind of memory
loss that hypnosis was used to restore and the specific technique
employed." 5 8
As for the first part of its test, the Hurd court said that a trial judge
"must consider ...the appropriateness of using hypnosis for the kind
of memory loss encountered." 5 9 The court found that "hypnosis often
is reasonably reliable in reviving normal recall where there is a pathological reason, such as a traumatic neurosis, for the witness's inability
to remember," but "the likelihood of obtaining reasonably accurate
recall diminishes if hypnosis is used simply to refresh a witness'[s]
memory concerning details where there may be no recollection at all,
60
or to 'verify' one of several conflicting accounts given by a witness.
The court also noted that a "related factor to be considered is whether
the witness has any discernible motivation for not remembering or for
'recalling' a particular version of the events. 6 1
Turning to the second part of its test, the Hurd court said that if "a
case is of a kind likely to yield normal recall if hypnosis is properly
administered, then it is necessary to determine whether the procedures followed were reasonably reliable. ' 62 The court said the priority must be to guard against contamination of the witness's testimony,
and thus, a trial judge should be particularly sensitive to the manner of
questioning, the presence of cues or suggestions, and the amenability
of the subject to hypnosis. 63 Furthermore, in order to provide an adequate record for evaluating the reliability of the hypnotic procedure,
the Hurd court adopted several procedural requirements based on the
testimony of Dr. Orne and what was prescribed by the court below.6 4
These requirements are:
(1) "a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must conduct the session;"
(2) "the professional conducting the hypnotic session should be independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or defense;"
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

95.
95, 97.
95.
95-96.
96.
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(3) "any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement
personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be
recorded, either in writing or another suitable form;"
(4) "before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain from the
subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them;"
(5) "all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be
recorded;"
(6) "only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during
any phase of the hypnotic session, including
the pre-hypnotic
65
testing and the post-hypnotic interview."
Over time, some jurisdictions have adopted the Hurd guidelines
verbatim, while others have followed Hurd with their own additions
and subtractions from its requirements.6 6 For example, courts have
relaxed the prohibition against third parties being present during any
phase of the hypnotic session,67 have added a corroboration factor,68
and/or have required that the hypnotic session take place at a neutral
site.6 9

The second case-by-case admission scheme for hypnotically refreshed testimony, which has found most of its adherents in the federal system, employs a "totality of the circumstances" test to assess
the reliability of the disputed testimony.7" Unlike the Hurd approach,
this scheme does not profess to offer a laundry list of relevant factors;
rather, it follows a more fungible practice of allowing each case to be
judged based upon its unique facts, with the litigants being given great
freedom in the range of their arguments regarding the reliability or
unreliability of the hypnotically refreshed testimony. 7 ' Ultimately,
the trial court is called upon to balance the risk of unreliable testimony against the value of the testimony if reliable, with the question
being whether the testimony is more likely than not to advance accurate fact-finding.72 Not surprisingly, however, over time, certain factors have been recognized as particularly important in assisting judges
65. Id. at 96-97.
66. See MORIARTY, supra note 1, § 13:37; Shaw, supra note 8, at 27-30 (including
examples of various states that modify the Hurd guidelines).
67. See State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (Idaho 1984) (stating that this court
would allow third parties to be present "if their attendance can be shown to be essential and steps are taken to prevent their influencing the results of the session").
68. See People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1017 (Colo. 1987).
69. See State v. Butterworth, 792 P.2d 1049, 1058 (Kan. 1990) ("If possible, the
hypnosis should be conducted in a neutral setting such as the expert's office. The use
of offices or locations controlled by the prosecution or the defense should be
avoided.").
70. See Roark v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 24, 35 (Ky. 2002); MORIARTY, supra
note 1, at § 13:37; 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23, § 6011, at 171-73.
71. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23, § 6011, at 171-73 (1990 & Supp.
2002).
72. See id. at 171.
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in making this determination.7 3 Specifically, courts have highlighted
such factors as:
the use of procedural safeguards, the presence of suggestive statements or other cues.... the quality of the witness's subsequent testimony, whether the testimony is corroborated by independent
evidence, the nature of the witness's memory loss, the consistency of
the testimony with prehypnosis recollection, the importance of the
testimony to the case, and the availability of evidence concerning
the hypnotist and the hypnotic session.7 4
Putting the four common-law approaches into reliability terms, the
per se admissible camp has decided that hypnotically refreshed testimony is reliable enough so that a witness's testimony that is partially
the product of hypnosis will not generally be kept away from the factfinder. On the other hand, the per se inadmissible approach holds that
hypnosis is such a potentially contaminating exercise that no witness's
hypnotically refreshed testimony is trustworthy enough to allow that
witness to be heard on the merits. This camp simply rejects, as a matter of course, the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony.
Those jurisdictions that follow one of the two conditional admission
approaches do not bar the receipt of hypnotically refreshed testimony
as too unreliable, but neither do they turn a blind eye to the issue.
Instead, each approach states that in the right situation, hypnotically
refreshed testimony can be reliable enough to allow the fact-finder to
use that testimony in reaching its decision. A finding of reliability in
any particular case depends upon the court either holding that a list of
Hurd-inspired factors are present or holding that the totality of the
circumstances satisfies the threshold standard of reliability. A similar,
although more in-depth, case-by-case inquiry into the reliability of scientific evidence has been called for by the Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.," and the Court's treatment of
the general reliability issue in that case is the subject of the next Part
of this Article.
III.

THE DAUBERT TEST FOR SCIENTIFIC RELIABILITY

In Frye v. United States,76 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, in a short and citation-free opinion, created
the "general acceptance" test for determining the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence.7 7 Over time, the Frye test became the test of
choice, in both federal and state courts, for determining the admissi73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id. at 171-72.
Id. (citations omitted). See Roark, 90 S.W.3d at 35.
See 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id. at 1014.
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bility of scientific evidence.78 In June of 1993, however, that changed
in the federal courts and began to change in the state courts with the
publication of the United States Supreme Court's Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.7 9 opinion. Based upon the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter FRE), specifically FRE 702
regarding expert testimony, 80 the Daubert Court rejected Frye's general acceptance test as an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility of
scientific evidence, and instead called for a more liberal and flexible
standard of admissibility that would be grounded in the principles of
relevance and reliability.8
Daubert's insistence on relevance flows directly from language in
FRE 702 that requires that evidence or testimony "'assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.'"82
This part of FRE 702 demands that any offered evidence or testimony
be relevant to the proceeding, which means that the information has
the "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."8 3 The Daubert Court used the
word "fit" to describe, in more simple terms, what it was talking
about, and in doing so the Court said that "[fit] is not always obvious
and that scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific
validity for other, unrelated purposes."' The key to the inquiry is to
determine whether the offered evidence or testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact.8 5 This will only be the case when there is a valid
scientific connection between 86the offered evidence or testimony and
the pertinent inquiry at hand.
78. See 1

PAUL C. GIANNELLI &
§ 1-5, at 11-12 (3d ed. 1999).
79. See 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIc

Evi-

DENCE

80.

FED.

R.

EVID.

702 states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Id.
81. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89.
82. See id. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).

83.

FED.

R.

EVID.

401.

84. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (citing James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States
Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposalto Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26
JURIMETRICS J. 249, 258 (1986)).
85. See id. at 591-92.
86. See id. The Court offered the following example to illustrate the point:
The study of the phases of the moon... may provide valid scientific "knowledge" about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in
issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain
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Focusing on the expert scientific testimony that was the subject of
the case (i.e., whether Bendectin was a human teratogenS7 ), the Court
said that in order for this testimony or any scientific evidence to be
admissible, it must be not only relevant, but also reliable.8 8 Given its
dependence on a scientific dispute for its substance, the Daubert
Court explained that this meant that for the testimony to satisfy evidentiary reliability it must be based upon scientific validity. In other
words, the underlying principle must support what it purports to
show.8 9

Offering what it called "some general observations," the Daubert
Court then discussed some non-exclusive factors that could bear on
the ultimate inquiry.90 The first of these is whether a theory or technique can be and has been tested, because "'[s]cientific methodology
[ ] is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they
can be falsified."91 The second is whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to scrutiny by others in the field through peer review and publication. 92 The Court said that "submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good science,' in
part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected."93 The third and fourth factors concern
whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high known or
potential rate of error, and whether there are standards controlling
the technique's operation.94 The fifth and final factor reinvigorates
the Frye test by asking whether the theory or technique enjoys general
acceptance within a relevant scientific community. 9 The Court did
not want a return to the dominance of Frye, but it recognized that
"[w]idespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and 'a known technique which has been able
to attract only minimal support within the community'
erly be viewed with skepticism. '"96

. . .

may prop-

night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was
unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night.
Id. at 591.
87. Id. at 582-83.
88. See id. at 594-95.
89. See id. at 590 & n.9.
90. Id. at 593-94.
91. Id. at 593 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)).
92. Id.

93. Id. (citing John Ziman,

RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION

GROUNDS FOR BELIEF IN SCIENCE

OF THE

130-33 (1978); Arnold S. Relman & Marcia An-

gell, How Good Is Peer Review?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 827 (1989)).
94. Id. at 594 (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978)).
95. See id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
96. See id. (quoting Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238).
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In the years following Daubert, the lower courts frequently struggled with two particular issues. First, even though FRE 702 speaks of
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, 9 7 many courts
that otherwise adopted Daubert,limited its application to only scientific expert testimony and evidence. 98 Second, notwithstanding the
qualifiers that the Court put on its Daubert list of reliability factors,
some courts applied these as if they were exclusive and mandatory
factors that must be satisfied before expert testimony or other scientific evidence was admissible.9 9 In an effort to address these concerns
and bring clarity to the field, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in
its March 1999 opinion of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.°°
On the question of Daubert's reach, the Kumho Tire opinion stated
that Daubert's general holding that discussed "the trial judge's [ ]
'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on 'technical' and
'other specialized' knowledge."' a' Daubert's fixation on the issue of
scientific testimony had been driven by its facts,1 02 but the plain language of FRE 702 does not draw a distinction among expert testimony
based upon scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. 3
Turning to the confusion regarding Daubert's reliability factors, the
Court in Kumho Tire reiterated Daubert'sdeclaration in favor of flexibility by stating that "Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case."'10 4 Instead,
the Court noted that trial courts are granted the same broad latitude
when they decide how to determine reliability as they enjoy in respect
to their ultimate reliability determination.'0 5 The Court pointed out
that "there are many different kinds of experts, and many different
kinds of expertise,"' 0 6 and thus, "'[t]he factors identified in Daubert
may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the
97. FED. R. EVID. 702.
98. 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.5, at
464-65 (5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter GRAHAM, HANDBOOK]; see Michael H. Graham,
The DaubertDilemma: At Last a Viable Solution?, 179 F.R.D 1, 5-6 (1998) [hereinafter Graham, Daubert Dilemma]; Patricia A. Krebs & Bryan J. De Tray, Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael: A Flexible Approach to Analyzing Expert Testimony Under
Daubert, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 989, 991-92 (1999).
99. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK, supra note 98, § 702.5, at 464; see Graham, Daubert
Dilemma, supra note 98, at 5-6.
100. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
101. Id. at 141.
102. See id. at 147-48.
103. Id. at 147-48. The Court also said that a distinction should not be drawn between scientific knowledge and technical or other specialized knowledge because it
would "prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules
under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon" drawing such a distinction,
because "no clear line ... divides the one from the others." Id. at 148.
104. Id. at 141.
105. Id. at 142.
106. Id. at 150.
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nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of
his testimony.""'1 7 The Kumho Tire majority opinion said that the
Court could "neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time
the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, . . . [because]
[t]oo much depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue."' 1 8 The Court took pains, however, to reiterate that
the underlying objective was to ensure the relevancy and reliability of
expert testimony and scientific evidence, which means that trial judges
must be diligent in meeting Daubert'sbasic gatekeeping requirement,
whatever factors prove ultimately to be decisive. 0 9
It is clear that if Daubert stands for anything, it stands for the proposition that scientific evidence must be reliable to be admissible. For
purposes of the present discussion, this brings us to the question of
whether hypnotically refreshed testimony should be subject to a
Daubert-inspired reliability screening in those jurisdictions that follow
its guidance. If it should, then we must go further and decide what
that screening should look like, and then determine whether hypnotically refreshed testimony is up to the test. These issues are the focus
of the next Part of this Article.

IV.

HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY AND THE
DA UBERT TEST

The issue, for our purposes, becomes the effect, if any, that Daubert
should have on the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony.
In other words, assuming that a case is brought in the federal court
system where the dictates of Daubert are binding or in a state that has
adopted Daubert and rejected either of the per se approaches to hypnotically refreshed testimony, should that testimony be required to
pass through a Daubert-inspired reliability gate before it gets to the
fact-finder? Furthermore, if it must pass through that gate, then what
should it look like?
The short response to the first question could be to say no and to
simply cite to a 1995 U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion
called Borawick v. Shay."' In that case, the court of appeals held that
the challenged hypnotically refreshed testimony was not subject to the
rigors of Daubert because the issue did not concern the admissibility
of data derived from scientific techniques or expert opinions; rather,
the issue was whether Borawick was a competent lay witness.1 '
Therefore, the court held that the earlier discussed "totality of the
107. Id. (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, at 19, Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 152.
110. 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995).
111. Id. at 610; cf. Mersch v. City of Dallas, 207 F.3d 732, 735-36 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding, without mentioning the Daubert opinion, that the totality of the circum-
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circumstances" test was the appropriate test for the occasion. 112 Even
though the Borawick court held that Daubert did not provide direct
guidance, it said that its decision was informed by the principles underlying that earlier Supreme Court opinion, and it noted that nothing
in Daubert was inconsistent with its outlined approach." 3 This last
comment from the court drew a parallel between the purpose of its
"totality of the circumstances" test and Daubert's search for evidentiary reliability. 1 4
Commentators have offered support for Borawick's refusal to apply
the Daubert gatekeeping function to hypnotically refreshed testimony
on a few grounds. First, Borawick's straightforward assertion that
hypnotically refreshed testimony is an issue of lay witness competency
and not an issue of scientific evidence has been endorsed. 1 5 Second,
a more practical concern has been advanced, claiming that "[t]rials
would grind to a halt under the weight of Daubert if the courts were
obligated to treat as scientific evidence all lay testimony that could be
considered, in the broadest sense, the product of some scientific
'1 16
process.'

Notwithstanding the outcome in Borawick and the arguments that
have been advanced in support of its conclusion, for reasons of history, common sense, and policy, a lawyer who finds herself in a
Daubertjurisdiction involved in a criminal case that includes hypnotically refreshed testimony should be prepared to support the admissibility of that testimony in terms that fit within Daubert'sframework.
As a matter of history, a large number of courts have treated the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony as a matter to be regulated by the rules governing the admissibility of scientific evidence or
testimony. 1 7 This is, of course, part of the same evidentiary paradigm
that Daubert is intended to control. Furthermore, in keeping with this
stances test was the test of choice for determining the admissibility of post-hypnotic
testimony in civil or criminal cases).
112. Borawick, 68 F.3d at 607.
113. Id. at 610.
114. See id.
115. See G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 979 (1996); 27 WRIGHT & GOLD,
supra note 23, § 6011, at 139.
116. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 23, § 6266, at 284 (1997).
117. See, e.g., Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65, 71 (Md. 1999) (noting that the turn away
from hypnotically refreshed testimony that took place in the late 1970s and early
1980s was the result of a "recognition that hypnosis was ... a scientific technique that
should be subjected to the Frye standard"); State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028, 1032-33
(Md. 1983) ("The majority of courts which have considered hypnosis as it affects testimony of a witness have applied the test laid down in Frye .. "); State v. Weston, 475
N.E.2d 805, 809-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) ("Given the mysterious and unfamiliar nature of hypnosis and its significant potential for abuse, a number of courts have approached the problem of hypnotically refreshed testimony as courts have historically
dealt with other novel scientific methods or procedures: through application of the
test set forth in Frye ... ") (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
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historical treatment of the issue, many courts continue to label hypnotically refreshed testimony as scientific evidence subject to the rules
that those jurisdictions employ in screening that type of evidence, 1 s
with a number of courts explicitly rejecting a Borawick-like approach
of making hypnotically refreshed testimony immune from a scientific
reliability screening. 119
Common sense also compels the conclusion that hypnotically refreshed testimony should be subject to the rigors of Daubert in those
jurisdictions that have adopted its test. Lay witness testimony that has
been refreshed by hypnosis is as much a form of scientific evidence as
is testimony that explains the results of DNA testing. This conclusion
does not require that "scientific evidence" be defined in an overly
broad fashion, as the former testimony flows directly from, and indeed
owes its existence to, the scientific discipline that is psychology, 120 just
as the latter testimony flows directly from and owes its existence to
the scientific discipline that is genetics. But for the direct application
of psychology through a hypnotic session, the hypnotically refreshed
lay witness would not be in possession of the information that he or
she is being called upon to relate to the court. To treat hypnotically
118. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1210-11 (Utah 1989) (citing cases from
a number of jurisdictions that have so held); cf. State v. Medrano, 86 S.W.3d 369, 373
(Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. filed) (noting that the Texas approach to hypnotically
refreshed testimony falls somewhere between a Frye approach and a Daubert-inspired
inquiry, in recognition of the fact that such testimony "cannot be logically dissociated
from the underlying scientific technique" that is hypnosis). See generally Abdur
Rahman v. Bell, 999 F. Supp. 1073, 1087 n.18 (M.D. Tenn. 1998), affd in part, vacated
in part on other grounds by 226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that audio-taped
statements made by a convicted murderer while under hypnosis were not admissible
because they failed to satisfy the requirements of Daubert); Rowland v. Commonwealth, 901 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Ky. 1995) (noting that the intermediate appellate court
had "concluded that it would be inappropriate to adopt a per se rule excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony in light of Daubert"and the fact that Kentucky's rule of
evidence regulating the admission of expert testimony was the same as FRE 702);
State v. Smith, 809 So. 2d 556, 567 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (Downing, J., dissenting in part
& concurring in part) ("The trial court should perform a gate keeping function as
required by Daubertand ascertain if hypnosis is solid science that is not susceptible to
suggestion before allowing such evidence to be introduced."); Breding v. State, 584
N.W.2d 493, 501-02 (N.D. 1998) (Meschke, J., concurring) (calling on hypnotically
refreshed testimony to be subjected to a Daubert-inspired reliability screening).
120. See, e.g., People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Ill. 1989) ("[H]ypnosis is a
technique which elicits scientific evidence and cannot properly be distinguished from
other forms of scientific evidence simply because the subject provides the testimony
rather than the 'scientist."'); Polk v. State, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1981) ("The technique of hypnosis is scientific, but the testimony itself of the witness
is the end product of the administration of the technique. The induced recall of the
witness is dependent upon, and cannot be disassociated from, the underlying scientific
method."); Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1211 ("The policy of ... threshold reliability tests [like
Frye] applies to hypnotically enhanced testimony just as much as it applies to the
testimony of experts because even if the one actually testifying is a lay witness, the
hypnotically enhanced testimony given by the witness is the product of scientific
intervention.").
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refreshed testimony differently from DNA evidence is to perpetuate
an approach in our courts that tends to judge the admissibility of evidence derived from the so-called "hard" sciences (e.g., chemistry and
physics) more stringently than evidence derived from the application
1 21
of the so-called "soft" sciences (e.g., psychology and sociology).
Like history and common sense, policy concerns also support a
Daubert screening of hypnotically refreshed testimony in Daubert jurisdictions. First, efficiency would be enhanced by such a holding. Instead of having two or more tests to screen this scientific evidence,
Daubert offers a single test of admissibility. To the extent it is claimed
that this is too rigid an approach, one only needs to recall the Supreme Court's admonition in Daubert and Kumho Tire that the process is meant to be flexible, taking into account the specifics of the
case and the form of the evidence being offered. 1 22 Second, insisting
that hypnotically refreshed testimony meet Daubert's requirements
would enhance the reliability of the process, because the linchpin to
admissibility under Daubert is evidentiary reliability. 1 23 Third, coherence would be enhanced and confusion reduced by bringing hypnotically refreshed testimony under Daubert in those jurisdictions that
have embraced its guidance. Again, the fixation on evidentiary reliability would generally serve both of these ends. Additionally, requiring this testimony to meet the rigors of a Daubert-inspired test as a
precursor to its admission into evidence would avoid a potentially incongruous result. If hypnotically refreshed testimony was allowed to
be heard without a Daubert screening, but then was attacked on the
ground that the use of hypnosis rendered that testimony unreliable,
then the opportunity would present itself for a court to deny a defense
of that testimony by a psychologist on the ground that this expert testimony could not meet the requirements of Daubert. If a psychologist
were to take the witness stand to offer testimony in support of admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony under attack, she may explicitly,
and would at least implicitly, invoke the mantle of science-i.e., psychology-and thus, an inquiry into the scientific validity of the reasoning and methodology underlying that expert's testimony would be
121. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New
Approach to the Admissibility of NontraditionalPsychological Evidence in Criminal
Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 29-30 (1987).
122. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) ("[A]s the Court
stated in Daubert,the test of reliability is 'flexible,' and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.");
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) ("The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one.").
123. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 ("[The] overarching subject is the scientific
validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate."); see also Kumho Tire, 526
U.S. at 141 ("In Daubert... this Court ... pointed out that [scientific expert] testimony is admissible only if it is both relevant and reliable.").
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appropriate and logical. 1 24 However, it is conceivable that a court
would conclude that the expert's testimony does not satisfy Daubert's
requirements, and thus, a court would deny the expert the opportunity
to be heard by the fact-finder even though the court had already adnitted the lay witness's testimony under challenge. 12 5 The far better
practice would be to require the hypnotically derived testimony to
survive a Daubert screening as a condition of its admissibility.
The possibility that hypnotically refreshed testimony will have to
pass through a Daubertconstructed gate before it makes its way to the
fact-finder brings us to the second question: i.e., what should that reliability gate look like for this testimony in particular? Even though the
Supreme Court in both Daubert and Kumho Tire went out of its way
to stress the flexibility of its reliability screening process,126 a defense
of hypnotically refreshed testimony would be well-served to articulate
that defense in terms reflective of Daubert's factors. Therefore, the
issues would be: whether the validity of hypnosis can be, and has
been, tested; whether research results on hypnosis have been subjected to peer review and publication; whether, in respect to hypnosis,
there is a high known or potential rate of error; whether there are
standards controlling its use; and whether hypnosis enjoys general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.
A key, if not the key, to answering the second question is to pin
down exactly what is being asked of hypnosis in the context of criminal cases. As mentioned earlier, a significant variation between many
of those jurisdictions holding that hypnotically refreshed testimony is
per se inadmissible versus those remaining open to its admissibility is
that different things are expected of hypnosis in different jurisdictions.
In the per se inadmissible jurisdictions, the inquiry has predominately
focused on the ability of hypnosis to revive historically accurate recall.127 On the other hand, in those jurisdictions that admit the evidence at least part of the time, the issue has often been cast in terms
of the ability of hypnosis to overcome amnesia and restore the memory of a witness.1 28 This same debate will come up in a Daubert
screening of hypnotically refreshed testimony because of that Court's
124. See Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Admissibility of Expert Testi-

mony Based upon ClinicalJudgment and Scientific Research, 4 PSYCHOL.

PUB. POL'Y

& L. 1226, 1249 (1998).
125. See generally Rowland v. Commonwealth, 901 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. 1995). The
court described a ruling by the trial court that refused to suppress witness testimony
that had been hypnotically refreshed, but that gave the defense leave to cross-examine that witness about the fact that she had been placed under hypnosis prior to
trial. That trial court ruling also included the proviso that if the defense brought up
the issue of hypnosis, the prosecution would be allowed to introduce additional testimony to explain and defend the practice. Id.
126. See supra note 122.
127. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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adherence to the relevance requirement in FRE 702.129 That is, the
testimony must "'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue.'" 1 3 ° The Daubert opinion said that this
condition goes primarily to relevance or "fit;" 13' 1 which means that
there has to be a connection between the scientific knowledge offered
and the contested issue in the case.
The easier position to defend is the one that revolves around the
ability of hypnosis to overcome amnesia and restore the memory of a
witness, 3 2 because hypnosis is frequently used in the clinical setting
for just this reason.13 3 One who plans to offer hypnotically refreshed
testimony in a criminal case, however, should not count on a court
framing the issue this way. Whether or not hypnosis is a proper
clinical technique to use with patients that are having memory
problems would seem to be beside the point when the issue is, for
example, whether or not the defendant raped the victim. The primary
function of a criminal trial is to uncover the truth about a pending
allegation of misconduct, and the successful accomplishment of this
goal depends upon objectively accurate testimony. 34 Therefore, an
advocate who is called upon to defend hypnotically refreshed testimony is well-advised, in keeping with Daubert's insistence on "fit," to
be prepared to address the ability of hypnosis to achieve historically
accurate recall.
The first Daubertreliability factor, put in terms relevant to our present inquiry, would ask whether the ability of hypnosis to extract historically accurate recall can be and has been tested. Indeed,
numerous studies of both the quantity and quality of recall facilitated
by hypnosis have been carried out. For example, Professors Jane
Dywan and Kenneth Bowers tested the ability of hypnosis to help subjects recall line drawings that they were shown a week prior to being
129.
130.
131.
132.
481.
133.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
Id. (citing Starrs, supra note 84, at 258).
See Frankel & Covino, supra note 11, at 346-48; Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at

See Frankel & Covino, supra note 11, at 346-48; see also ROBERT G. MEYER,
347 (1992) ("Most clinicians and laypersons believe
that the use of hypnosis will aid in the production of recall."); Yapko, supra note 7, at
166 (noting that over 97% of the respondents agreed with the statement that
"[h]ypnosis is a worthwhile psychotherapy tool").
134. See Shaw, supra note 8, at 15.
[Increased recall as a result of hypnosis is useful as testimony in a trial only
if the newly retrieved memories are veridical. If a large percentage of these
memories are inaccurate, then they are worse than useless; a jury might
reach the wrong verdict in reliance upon them. Thus, if a party in a criminal
trial wishes to have a previously hypnotized witness testify, the court must
determine the extent that the witness will be testifying to accurate memories,
not to pseudomemories created by suggestion or confabulation.
PRACTICAL CLINICAL HYPNOSIS
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hypnotized.13 5 These researchers found that subjects who were highly
hypnotizable recalled more than twice the number of new items as the
controls when they were put under hypnosis; however, they also made
almost three times as many new errors as the controls, whose recall
was facilitated only by task-motivated conditions.1 36 Similarly, Professors Glenn S. Sanders and William L. Simmons tested the effect of
hypnosis on the ability of subjects to recall the particulars of a twentysecond film depicting a pickpocketing incident.1 37 These researchers
divided their subjects into two groups, one that would undergo hypno38
sis and one that would not, and showed both groups the same film.'
A week later, in connection with viewing a videotape of a line-up related to the robbery and answering ten specific questions about the
event, both groups were invited to "'re-play' the incident on an internal, mental TV screen, complete with slow-down and speed-up features, stop-action and zoom-in," with one group viewing the line-up
and answering the questions while under hypnosis. 39 Sanders and
Simmons reported that the subjects who were under hypnosis at the
time of viewing the line-up tape and responding to questions about
that tape made more errors than those who were not hypnotized during these same exercises, due largely to the tendency of the hypnotized subjects to choose a decoy in the line-up who was wearing
the
140
distinctive jacket that the pickpocket wore in the original film.
While the studies just mentioned claimed that hypnosis invites some
level of recall error, they did not, in any significant way, seek to uncover the cause behind their conclusion. As the reader may recall, in
the Hurd case, three explanations were given for why hypnotically refreshed testimony may produce recall error: a hypnotized person is
extremely vulnerable to suggestions from intentional or inadvertent
cues; a person under hypnosis is susceptible to a loss of critical judgment, in that he is more willing to speculate and will respond to questions with a confidence he would not have as a waking person; and the
hypnotic experience can cause a person to confound memories evoked
under hypnosis with prior recall.1 4 ' Given that the first of these explanations would entail the injection of external stimuli into the hypnotic
session, which is something that can be controlled and tested, there
have been a number of studies that have looked specifically at the
ability of a hypnotist to suggest or implant a false memory into a hypnotized subject's recall.
135. Jane Dywan & Kenneth Bowers, The Use of Hypnosis to Enhance Recall, 222
Sci. 184, 184 (1983).
136. Id. at 184-85.
137. Glenn S. Sanders & William L. Simmons, Use of Hypnosis to Enhance Eyewitness Accuracy: Does It Work?, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 70, 72 (1983).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 72-73.
140. Id. at 73-74.
141. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 93 (N.J. 1981).
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Jean-Roch Laurence and Campbell Perry of Concordia University
in Montreal, Canada, suggested to hypnotized subjects, all of whom
were highly hypnotizable, that one night during the previous week
their sleep had been disturbed by a loud sound.14 2 After the hypnotic
session was terminated, thirteen of twenty-seven subjects persisted in
their belief, in contrast to their pre-hypnosis reports, that some sleepdisturbing sound had occurred.14 3 In fact, all thirteen of the subjects
maintained this erroneous belief even after being told that the hypnotist had suggested the sounds to them while they were under
hypnosis.14 4
Laurence and Perry, along with Louise Labelle and Robert Nadon,
repeated the sleep disturbance experiment a few years after the original effort.1 45 While under hypnosis, sixteen (one low, eight moderately-highly, and seven highly hypnotizable) of thirty-two subjects
responded positively when asked whether, on a particular night in
question, they heard a loud noise that may have sounded like a car
backfiring or a door slamming.' 4 6 After the hypnotic session was terminated, eleven of these sixteen subjects continued to maintain that
the suggested noise actually happened.' 4 7 This final group was made
up entirely of highly and moderately-highly hypnotizable subjects. 1 48
The studies referenced in the previous paragraphs, and others like
them,'1 49 have been subjected, as Daubert's second factor would require, to the scrutiny of peer review, with two general conclusions being reached. First, the studies show a tendency for hypnosis in the
experimental setting to facilitate greater recall of meaningful material,
but the price paid for this greater quantity of information is more in150
correct recall and an increased sense of confidence in that recall.
142. Jean-Roch Laurence & Campbell Perry, Hypnotically Created Memory
Among Highly Hypnotizable Subjects, 222 Sci. 523, 523 (1983). After being hypnotized, the subjects were first asked to choose one night of the previous week and
describe, in detail, their activities of that night. Id. Once it had been ascertained that
a subject had no specific memories of awakening or of dreams occurring during the
specified night, the subject was then instructed to relive that night and asked whether
he or she had heard a loud noise that had awakened him or her. Id.
143. Id. at 524. Six of these thirteen subjects were unequivocal in their certainty,
while the remaining seven came to the conclusion on the basis of a reconstruction of
events. Id.
144. Id.
145. Louise Labelle et al., Hypnotizability,Preferencefor an Imagic Cognitive Style,
and Memory Creation in Hypnosis, 99 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 222, 224 (1990).
146. Id. at 224-25. Of the thirty-two total subjects, eight were classified as low
hypnotizable, thirteen were classified as moderately highly hypnotizable, in the high
range of this group, and eleven were designated as highly hypnotizable. Id. at 225.
147. Id. at 225.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., BROWN ET AL., supra note 1, at 323-35 (providing an extensive review of the hypnotic pseudomemory research); Labelle et al., supra note 143, at 223.
150. See Council on Sci. Affairs, Am. Med. Assoc., Scientific Status of Refreshing
Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 JAMA 1918, 1921 (1985) [hereinafter
AMA]; Frankel & Covino, supra note 11, at 356; Kanovitz, supra note 3, at 1224-25;
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Second, research has shown that experimental subjects can be influenced by a hypnotist to believe that they experienced something that

was merely suggested to them, with the highly hypnotizable subjects
being most at risk.15 1 These conclusions, however, have not escaped

criticism.
Many within the behavioral science community have warned
against making too much out of research like that discussed above,
because they perceive a "strained analogy between the laboratory and
the forensic setting. '' 152 Specifically, one claim is that these studies

generally focus only on the short-term effects of hypnosis on memory,
whereas the forensic setting is much more concerned with the longterm impact on recall because of the time that it takes court cases to
move through the system.1 53 The argument is that it has not been

shown that the contaminating effects, if any, of hypnosis on memory
will retain strength over such a long period of time.15 4 Moreover, the

point is made that many of the studies that support the above criticisms of hypnosis included within their design demand characteristics
like forced-choice responses and compelled guessing that increased

the amount of inaccurate information reported by subjects.' 55 Critics
also challenge the conclusions drawn from the research on the ground
that the laboratory cannot adequately replicate the role and impact

that emotion and content play in the use of hypnosis to extract memories grounded in real-world traumatic experiences.1 5 6 This criticism
goes hand-in-hand with another, which argues that there is great disparity between the motivational factors at work in an experimental
effort (e.g., a college student volunteering to serve as a research subMcConkey, supra note 8, at 2; MEYER, supra note 133, at 348-50; Peter W. Sheehan &
Kevin M. McConkey, Forensic Hypnosis: The Application of Ethical Guidelines, in
HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 719, 720-21 (Judith W. Rhue et al. eds., 1993).
151. See Frankel & Covino, supra note 11, at 356; Kanovitz, supra note 3, at
1230-31, 1236; Labelle et al., supra note 145, at 223; McConkey, supra note 8, at 2.
152. See, e.g., BROWN ET AL., supra note 1, at 335-41; Scheflin et al., supra note 2,
at 483-85; see also AMA, supra note 150, at 1920 ("Generalization from the laboratory to the real world depends on the degree to which the laboratory situation accurately represents the field situation.").
153. Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 484; see BROWN ET AL., supra note 1, at 337.
154. Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 484.
155. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 1, at 335-37; HAMMOND ET AL., CLINICAL HYPNOSIS AND MEMORY: GUIDELINES FOR CLINICIANS AND FOR FORENSIC HYPNOSIS 19
(1995).
156. HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 155, at 12-13; Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at
484-85; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 1, at 322.
[H]ypnosis is especially more likely to assist someone in recalling personally
meaningful, affect-laden events, than nonmeaningful information about
which the person is indifferent. For instance, hypnotically enhanced recall is
more likely to occur in someone where emotional trauma has created a
block to his/her ability to recall a memory (due to the state-dependent nature of some memories and the manner in which a trained professional may
reinstate the encoding context and mood through hypnosis).
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ject) and those at work in a criminal forensic setting (e.g., a witness or
victim undergoing hypnosis in order to retrieve memories that may
lead to the conviction of an alleged wrongdoer). 157 Shifting the focus
slightly, critics of the experimental studies also claim that an impor-

tant variable in the success of hypnosis is a trusting and caring relationship between the hypnotist and the subject, and this is158something
that is rarely, if ever, replicated in the laboratory setting.

Another avenue of peer commentary attempts to bolster the acceptability of hypnotically refreshed testimony by comparing it to recall
generated in other ways. 159 The claim here is that hypnosis is not nec-

essarily more contaminating to recall than any other memory retrieval
effort, because the dangers of confabulation and memory hardening
are not unique to, nor exacerbated by, hypnosis.' 60 In other words,

the argument is that hypnosis does not render one more likely to experience either of these detrimental outcomes when compared with
recall generated by other means. This view perceives suggestion on

the part of those in control of the hypnotic session as the relevant,
externally generated threat to the reliability of a hypnotically refreshed memory, and thus claims that
as long as that danger is abated
61
the testimony should be admitted.1

The "no more contaminating than" argument of the previous paragraph would appear to have relevance within a Daubert screening ex-

ercise. This is because it addresses the critical question of whether

hypnosis can generate historically accurate recall. 162 Adherents of this

position acknowledge the possibility of error, but they claim that this
possibility can be eliminated, or at least kept to an acceptable limit, so
long as proper procedures are followed in carrying out the hypnotic
session. 163 This mention of the possibility of error and controlling the
157. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 1, at 313; HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 155, at
12; Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 485.
158. See Brown et al., supra note 1, at 317.
159. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 155, at 18-23; Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at
488-89.
160. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 155, at 22; Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at
486, 488.
161. HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 155, at 22-23; see Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at
488-89; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 1, at 322 ("Memory is not fully accurate no
matter what method someone uses to examine the past, and it may be influenced by
suggestions offered in a waking or hypnotic state.").
162. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
163. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 155, at 22-23; see also Scheflin et al., supra
note 2, at 489.
Fundamental fairness demands that each case be heard on its own merits,
at least at a preliminary hearing where the quality of the evidence can be
judicially assessed. The per se rule prohibits posthypnotic memories from
being admitted into evidence even though it can be shown that the hypnosis
procedures were scrupulously neutral and that the memories can be independently corroborated as true.
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same through the implementation of selected procedures takes us to
the third and fourth Daubert screening factors: i.e., what is the error
rate of hypnotically refreshed testimony, and how, if at all, do we
eliminate or at least control that error rate?
Putting Daubert'serror rate inquiry into terms that are relevant to
the present effort, the issue is one of determining the rate at which
hypnosis generates historically inaccurate recall. The general findings
from the previously mentioned research, regarding the tendency of
hypnosis to increase the amount of inaccurate recall and the fact that
memories can be contaminated through suggestion during hypnosis
establish that hypnosis does produce some memories.' 6 4 In light of
this, the question becomes one of trying to determine the error rate,
and this proves to be a very difficult task. The simple fact is that with
hypnotically recalled memories, one cannot necessarily tell what
memories are true from what memories are false.16 5 One of the possible explanations for this, as demonstrated in the experimental research, is that subjects who recall details under hypnosis tend to
experience an increase in their confidence in those details, to the extent that the story they now tell will appear to be compelling, even
though it may not be true. 6 6 Even keeping in mind that all memory
suffers from a similar problem, albeit in a generally somewhat weakened form, this turn of events is troublesome for supporters of hypnotically refreshed testimony because, as the proponents of the
evidence, they have the burden of proving its reliability, which can be
a near, if not absolute, impossibility in regard to all of the details recalled. Therefore, the only hope for the proponents of hypnotically
refreshed testimony is to encourage courts to take each case on its
own merits, rather than rejecting such testimony out-of-hand. This, of
course, is the approach that the Hurd and "totality-of-the-circumstances" jurisdictions have taken towards this testimony, and it is an
inquiry that has its place in a Daubert-inspired reliability test.
Given that there is an error rate associated with hypnotically refreshed recall and given that this error rate will fluctuate from case-tocase, the question becomes how can one control the hypnotic session
so as to eliminate or reduce the error rate and increase the likelihood
of extracting historically accurate memories. This question, in turn,
brings us to the fourth step in a Daubert test of the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony-a step that requires focusing attention
on the standards that are available for controlling the use of hypnosis.
This step is reminiscent of the common-law Hurd and "totality of the
circumstances" approaches to dealing with hypnotically refreshed
restimony. Although neither of those two approaches would be insuf164. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
165. See AMA, supra note 150, at 1922; Frankel & Covino, supra note 11, at
356-57; MEYER, supra note 133, at 343; Yapko, supra note 7, at 169.
166. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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ficient, in and of themselves, to determine the admissibility of some
challenged hypnotically refreshed testimony in a Daubertjurisdiction,
they can serve as guides when applying Daubert's fourth reliability
factor to that type of testimony.
As we saw in Part II of this article, the Hurd and "totality-of-thecircumstances" jurisdictions have fashioned a list of practices that are
specifically aimed at controlling or eliminating contaminating influences from the hypnotic session. 1 67 These practices were originally
developed by behavioral scientists, and these researchers and commentators have continued to agree that these requirements are necessary to enhance the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony. 168
In addition to generally vouching for the Hurd and "totality-of-thecircumstances" reliability-enhancing practices, behavioral science researchers and commentators have consistently spoken to other requirements that should be included as part of good hypnotic
technique. There is a strong consensus in this community in favor of
assessing the hypnotizability of a subject who is going to be put into a
trance. 16 9 Hypnotizability is a stable and measurable trait,170 and
those with higher levels of hypnotizability have been found to be better able to use vivid mental imagery as a means of enhancing and expanding their recall. 17 ' Because hypnotizability correlates positively
with suggestibility and the suspension of critical judgment, the more
hypnotizable a subject is, the greater the risk that the accuracy of his
or her recall will be compromised. 172 Therefore, the failure to test for
hypnotizability could be a definitive block to the admissibility of any
hypnotically refreshed testimony. On the other hand, if the hypnotizability of a witness whose hypnotically refreshed testimony is under
consideration has been measured, then, generally speaking, a finding
that the witness falls in the highly hypnotizable range would be a factor weighing against the reliability of the testimony, whereas the fact
that the witness falls in the moderate or low hypnotizable
range would
73
be a factor in favor of admitting the testimony.
167. See supra notes 65, 73-74 and accompanying text.
168. See MEYER, supra note 133, at 352-56; Helmut Relinger & Thomas Stem,
Guidelinesfor Forensic Hypnosis, 1983 J. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 69, 70-73; Sheehan &
McConkey, supra note 150, at 725-28.
169. See Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 485-86; Sheehan & McConkey, supra note
150, at 726.
170. E.g., Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 478.
171. See Frankel & Covino, supra note 11, at 347.
172. See Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 486; see also Frankel & Covino, supra note
11, at 350 ("[The hypnotizability] of the person... seems to be an important influence
on a subject's ability to distort memory.").
173. See Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 486. But cf. BROWN ET AL., supra note 1, at
339.
[Llaboratory research confirms that the great majority of hypnotized people,
includingpersons who are highly hypnotizable, do not seem to generally mistake hypnotically suggested fantasies for real events, as alleged by those per-
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In addition to putting a great deal of emphasis on the hypnotizability issue, behavioral science researchers and commentators have
also highlighted two other practices that are designed to protect the
integrity of hypnotically refreshed testimony. The first of these is the
need to make sure that a witness, whose testimony has allegedly been
refreshed under hypnosis, was in fact hypnotized.1 7 4 Because hypnosis is a condition that can be faked with some success, 1 7 5 and because
this issue has on occasion caught the attention of the courts,17 6 an advocate of a particular piece of hypnotically refreshed testimony should
be prepared to discuss whether that danger is present in any particular
case. The best practice would be one that, as a matter of routine, administers one or more tests during the hypnotic session to determine if
the subject is actually in a trance.1 77
Another reliability enhancing practice highlighted by the scientific
community is the need to avoid the "television technique" of hypnosis. This technique, which has been widely used by police departments
in the past, involves telling hypnotized subjects that their memories
are analogous to a videotape, complete with freeze-frame, pause, and
reverse, and that hypnosis can help them provide additional details of
which they are not aware.1 78 Unfortunately, this particular hypnosis
strategy has the effect of encouraging subjects to guess and be creative
in the absence of actual memories, and it causes subjects to develop
an
179
artificial sense of certainty about the veracity of their memory.
petuating the most recent in the long line of myths about hypnosis. Instead,
available studies substantiate that when subjects are encouraged to provide
honest and candid descriptions, pseudomemory reports appears to be minimized ....
Id.
174. See, e.g., MEYER, supra note 133, at 354; Sheehan & McConkey, supra note
150, at 727.
175. Sheehan & McConkey, supra note 150, at 727; see MEYER, supra note 133, at
354; Martin T. Orne, The Construct of Hypnosis: Implications of the Definition for
Research and Practice,in CONCEPTUAL AND INVESTIGATIVE APPROACHES TO HYPNOSIS AND HYPNOTIC PHENOMENA 14, 24 (William E. Edmonston, ed., 1977); see also
Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 479 ("[A] number of reports have emerged illustrating
...feigned stories elicited under hypnosis ...." (citations omitted)).
176. See, e.g., Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence That Witness in
Criminal Case Was Hypnotized, for Purposes of Determining Admissibility of Testimony Given Under Hypnosis or of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 16 A.L.R.5th
841, 845-46 (1993).
177. See MEYER, supra note 133, at 354 ("A suggestion for anesthesia of the subject's hand and subsequent application of a hemostat to demonstrate trance is one
technique that can be performed. It is difficult for a simulator to tolerate this test
because of the degree of discomfort evoked by this stimulus." (citation omitted)); see
also Sheehan & McConkey, supra note 150, at 727 ("The real problem is that criteria
need to be developed and applied that discriminate with a reasonable degree of confidence between deeply hypnotized clients and simulators.").
178. Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 481-82; see MEYER, supra note 133, at 348, 355.
179. MEYER, supra note 133, at 355; Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 482; see also
Shaw, supra note 8, at 14-15 ("Age regression techniques and 'video recorder' metaphors often used to enhance memory in criminal cases are methods which psycholo-
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It is here, within Daubert'sfourth factor, that a defender of hypnotically refreshed testimony would want to focus a reviewing court's attention in order to maximize the likelihood of the testimony being
admitted. The defender cannot afford to rest solely on the science,
because as we have seen, the science would leave the court at the
point of an uncertain error rate attaching to the testimony. 180 Instead,
relying upon the fact that the Supreme Court in both Daubert and
Kumho Tire stressed the flexibility of its reliability screening,1 8 ' the
defender would need to convince the court that the standards available for controlling the use of hypnosis can eliminate, or least heavily
mitigate, the error rate. In other words, the proponent must prove
that because care was taken in extracting the hypnotically refreshed
testimony in question, it is sufficiently reliable so as to justify its admission into evidence.
In order to be in a strong position to carry this burden, the proponent of the evidence will have to demonstrate strict compliance with
the standards that the courts and the scientific community have identified as critical to the reliability of the outcome. The ultimate goal is to
end up with hypnotically refreshed testimony that is as free as possible
of contaminating influences. Keeping in mind all of the specific details discussed about good hypnotic practice in this Article, some general guidelines have emerged that can serve as markers of good
practice in the forensic use of hypnosis. First, in order to increase the
likelihood of an unassailable outcome, the hypnotist should be an independent, qualified psychiatrist or psychologist.182 Second, the use
of hypnosis must be appropriate for the kind of memory loss encountered. Generally speaking, hypnosis is a more useful tool when it is
used to overcome a memory block that can be traced to a highly emotional event. 183 Third, the subject must be an appropriate candidate
for the use of hypnosis. This requirement covers the issue of hypnotizability, which has already been discussed,18 4 and it includes the need
gists have found are virtually guaranteed to induce confabulation." (footnote
omitted)).
180. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 122.
182. See MEYER, supra note 133, at 352 ("The expert [hypnotist] should be an independent practitioner who has no vested interest in the outcome of the case.");
Sheehan & McConkey, supra note 150, at 723.
183. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; Sheehan & McConkey, supra note
150, at 726; see also Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 481.
Traumatic amnesias may be reversible using hypnosis, usually accompanied
by the experience of strong emotion. Indeed, the greater accessibility of
these memories when the emotion can be experienced ...by hypnosis is
explained by the theory of state-dependent memory. [P]eople are better
able to remember the content of material when they are in the same emotional state while trying to recall it that they were in when the material was
learned.
Id. (citations omitted).
184. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
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to be sensitive to the different motivating factors that various subjects
185
(e.g., witness, victim, or suspect) may bring to the hypnotic session.
Fourth, as already mentioned, the totality of the hypnotic session must
be controlled so as to eliminate suggestive influences. 186 Fifth, the
best practice would be to ensure that there is a detailed record, preferably a videotape record, of the entire hypnotic process that can be
reviewed independently by the court. 187 Given the point at which the
science rests regarding the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony, a court will need to see that those things that present a danger
to reliability have not been allowed to impact the hypnotically refreshed testimony offered.
The fifth and final Daubert factor requires a Frye-type inquiry,
which asks whether hypnosis as a means of extracting historically accurate recall enjoys general acceptance within the behavioral science
community. As mentioned earlier, the Daubert Court did not intend a
return to the dominance of Frye, but it did believe that widespread
acceptance, or rejection, can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible or not. 188 In the context of hypnotically refreshed testimony, the picture is not all that clear when it comes to its
status within the behavioral science community. There are those who,
focusing largely upon the empirical data, have concluded that hypnosis is as yet an unproven technique when it comes to the recovery of
true memory. 189 At the same time, however, there are many who
maintain that when proper guidelines are followed, hypnosis can be
effective in retrieving otherwise unavailable, accurate information.1 90
In the end, the Frye debate over hypnotically refreshed testimony
comes to the same point as did the analysis of the previous four
Daubert factors. Whether one looks with favor upon hypnotically refreshed testimony depends upon the extent to which one is strictly
wedded to experimental research results versus the extent to which
one will be willing to place faith in good technique. A court that insists upon it being scientifically proven that hypnosis produces either
only historically accurate recall or the ability to tell the difference between accurate and inaccurate recall is not going to be receptive to
hypnotically refreshed testimony. On the other hand, a view that recognizes the limitations of the technique as established by the science,
185. See Scheflin et al., supra note 2, at 485; Sheehan & McConkey, supra note 150,
at 725-26.
186. See supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text; see also MEYER, supra note
133, at 354 ("Whether hypnosis causes confabulation can depend on the manner in
which the questions are asked.").
187. See MEYER, supra note 133, at 352; see also Sheehan & McConkey, supra note
150, at 723 (reporting that two learned societies devoted to hypnosis have called for
all forensic hypnosis sessions to be recorded on videotape).
188. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Frankel & Covino, supra note 11, at 355-57.
190. See, e.g., HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 155, at 22-23.
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but that still holds that it can produce sufficiently reliable testimony if
done properly, will accept its admission into court. As already stated,
the latter view is more in keeping with the Supreme Court's call in
Daubert and Kumho Tire for a more liberal and flexible standard of
admissibility for scientific evidence that is grounded in the principles
of relevance and reliability. 19 1
V.

CONCLUSION

Experts wishing to practice competently in a well-conducted
Daubert/Kumho hearing will find the new environment a spur to
improving their testimony about complex science issues. By contrast, careless experts in Daubert/Kumho cross-examinations may
reveal culpable technical and ethical errors. It is up to experts to
uphold the highest standards of their respective professions, disclose
fully and fairly the bases for their opinions, rely to the greatest extent possible on solid scientific findings, explain in understandable
terms the uncertainties in their opinions, and be frank about the
degree to which their 1theories
and methods meet, or fail to meet,
92
Daubert requirements.
Taking the general guidance of this quote and specifically applying
it to a defense of hypnotically refreshed testimony in a Daubertjurisdiction, one can see rather clearly the path that must be followed if
that defense is going to succeed. Rather than running away from research results that call the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony into question, an advocate of this testimony must be prepared
to speak intelligently about that research, its strengths, and its limitations. It is not going to be enough to simply say that the research does
not have applicability in the forensic setting, because this leaves the
proponent with a blank slate in the face of bearing the burden to support the admissibility of the testimony. The advocate is going to have
to speak candidly to the court about the possibility of inaccurate testimony flowing from the hypnotic session, but then, while highlighting
Daubert's intended flexibility, stress that the likelihood of that inaccuracy has been severely diminished by the use of techniques specifically
aimed at eliminating, or at least mitigating, the possibility of suggestive influences. Of course, this assumes that the practices for controlling hypnosis were indeed employed to such a rigorous degree, and, as
we have seen, that is no small task.
191. See supra note 122.
192. William M. Grove & R. Christopher Barden, Protecting the Integrity of the
Legal System: The Admissibility of Testimony from Mental Health Experts Under
Daubert/Kumho Analyses, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 224, 238 (1999).
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